Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_3zbMath1287.91004OpenAlexW2142663383MaRDI QIDQ3586381

Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, Tobias Harks, Alexander Skopalik

Publication date: 6 September 2010

Published in: Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/computing-pure-nash-and-strong-equilibria-in-bottleneck-congestion-games(4067cc21-1b71-4a03-ac6d-f5687c55579c).html

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (9)

On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria ⋮ Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property ⋮ Collusion in atomic splittable routing games ⋮ Computing pure Nash equilibria in network revenue management games ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria ⋮ The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness

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