Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_4zbMath1287.91086OpenAlexW1495402553MaRDI QIDQ3586382

Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 6 September 2010

Published in: Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

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