Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study

DOI10.3982/ECTA8112zbMath1232.91311OpenAlexW1893493084WikidataQ56658244 ScholiaQ56658244MaRDI QIDQ3587014

Muriel Niederle, Dan Levin, Asen Ivanov

Publication date: 2 September 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8112

zbMATH Keywords

beliefscommon-value auctionslevel-\(k\) modelwinner's cursecursed equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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