On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-14165-2_9zbMath1287.91082OpenAlexW1505895689MaRDI QIDQ3587371

Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier

Publication date: 7 September 2010

Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14165-2_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions

This page was built for publication: On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions