Inspection games with long-run inspectors

DOI10.1017/S0956792510000136zbMath1233.91064MaRDI QIDQ3587577

Luciano Andreozzi

Publication date: 8 September 2010

Published in: European Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (3)

A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem ⋮ Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy ⋮ Distributing inspections in space and time -- proposed solution of a difficult problem

Cites Work

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• The economics of crime and punishment: An analysis of optimal penalty
• The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations

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