A NOTE ON DISCRETE BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTION WITH GENERAL VALUE DISTRIBUTION

DOI10.1142/S0219198910002520zbMath1232.91278OpenAlexW2060231964MaRDI QIDQ3589654

Gangshu (George) Cai, Xiting Gong, Peter R. Wurman

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002520

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriumfirst-price sealed-bid auctiondiscrete bid

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

Cites Work

• The discrete bid first auction
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Rational products of sines of rational angles
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Optimal auctions revisited

This page was built for publication: A NOTE ON DISCRETE BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTION WITH GENERAL VALUE DISTRIBUTION