On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/11496915_13zbMath1119.91302OpenAlexW1554620983MaRDI QIDQ3596363

Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz

Publication date: 30 August 2007

Published in: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496915_13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

Related Items (20)

A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games ⋮ On the impact of player capability on congestion games ⋮ On poisoned Wardrop equilibrium in congestion games ⋮ The price of anarchy in series-parallel network congestion games ⋮ Graphical congestion games ⋮ r-extreme signalling for congestion control ⋮ Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents ⋮ Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games ⋮ Inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium in a traffic network under ATIS ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment ⋮ Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow ⋮ The price of anarchy of affine congestion games with similar strategies ⋮ Nonadaptive Selfish Routing with Online Demands ⋮ A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games ⋮ Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion ⋮ Price and capacity competition ⋮ Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium ⋮ Selfishness Need Not Be Bad ⋮ Efficiency and fairness of system-optimal routing with user constraints

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