Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
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Publication:3599137
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-85238-4_25zbMath1173.91351OpenAlexW1540840058MaRDI QIDQ3599137
Gábor Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe, Markus Nowak
Publication date: 3 February 2009
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85238-4_25
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Artificial intelligence (68T99)
Related Items (4)
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control ⋮ Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control ⋮ Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference ⋮ Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
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- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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