EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE

DOI10.1017/S1365100508070351zbMath1153.91669OpenAlexW2114985796MaRDI QIDQ3601587

Radim Boháček

Publication date: 11 February 2009

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100508070351

zbMATH Keywords

macroeconomic policyasymmetric and private informationcomputable general equilibrium modelsprovision and effects of welfare programs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation

This page was built for publication: EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE