Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10zbMath1209.91045OpenAlexW1670930141MaRDI QIDQ3602834

Martin Gairing

Publication date: 12 February 2009

Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Distributed systems (68M14)

Related Items (5)

Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures ⋮ Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality ⋮ Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures ⋮ Internalization of social cost in congestion games ⋮ Social learning in nonatomic routing games

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• Algorithms and Computation
• Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
• Atomic resource sharing in noncooperative networks

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