MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
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Publication:3606357
DOI10.1142/S0219198908001844zbMath1185.91042MaRDI QIDQ3606357
Frédéric Koessler, Françoise Forges
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
information transmissionincomplete informationcheap talkcertificationjointly controlled lotteriesverifiable types
Related Items (2)
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission
Cites Work
- Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
- Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
- The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Long Cheap Talk
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