MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001844zbMath1185.91042MaRDI QIDQ3606357

Frédéric Koessler, Françoise Forges

Publication date: 26 February 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissionincomplete informationcheap talkcertificationjointly controlled lotteriesverifiable types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission

Cites Work

• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Long Cheap Talk

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