Hierarchical Game and Bi-level Optimization for Controlling Network Usage Via Pricing

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-72709-5_27zbMath1181.90057OpenAlexW1485017431MaRDI QIDQ3614992

Yezekael Hayel

Publication date: 17 March 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72709-5_27

zbMATH Keywords

queueing theorypricinghierarchical game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Applications of game theory (91A80) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

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• Discriminatory processor sharing queues with stationary ergodic service times and the performance of TCP in overload
• Hierarchical optimization: An introduction
• Pricing strategies under heterogeneous service requirements.
• A Stackelberg network game with a large number of followers
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• A mathematical analysis of the cumulus pricing scheme
• Sharing a Processor Among Many Job Classes
• Time-shared Systems
• Queue-Length Distribution for the Discriminatory Processor-Sharing Queue

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