Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
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Publication:361803
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0304-8zbMath1300.91007OpenAlexW2138495280MaRDI QIDQ361803
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Aleksej Vladimirovich Savvateev
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15498/1/wp_idei_715.pdf
Related Items (6)
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ Finding the nucleolus of any \(n\)-person cooperative game by a single linear program ⋮ Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities ⋮ A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities ⋮ A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
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