Strategies in the principal-agent model

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0706-2zbMath1271.91074OpenAlexW1995359224MaRDI QIDQ361824

Roberto C. Raimondo, James Mirrlees

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/282684

zbMATH Keywords

Brownian motionagency theoryincentive schemesprincipal-agent problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.) (60H30)

Related Items

Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers

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