Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
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Publication:361828
DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0709-ZzbMath1319.91088OpenAlexW2027236350MaRDI QIDQ361828
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0709-z
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