COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001935zbMath1157.91337OpenAlexW3121551631MaRDI QIDQ3618900

Harold Houba

Publication date: 3 April 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001935

zbMATH Keywords

computationnon-transferable utilityproperty rightsalternating offerssecond welfare theoremwalrasian equilibriumbilateral river basin managementwater price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (5)

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems ⋮ The welfare implications of transboundary storage and dam ownership on river water trade ⋮ DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT? ⋮ The seawall bargaining game ⋮ Composition properties in the river claims problem

Cites Work

• Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
• An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function
• Evaluating cooperative game theory in water resources
• The policy bargaining model
• The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems
• Sharing a river.
• Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations
• Alternating offers in economic environments
• The Nash rationing problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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