COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
DOI10.1142/S0219198908001935zbMath1157.91337OpenAlexW3121551631MaRDI QIDQ3618900
Publication date: 3 April 2009
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001935
computationnon-transferable utilityproperty rightsalternating offerssecond welfare theoremwalrasian equilibriumbilateral river basin managementwater price
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
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- The Nash rationing problem
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