AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001947zbMath1157.91420MaRDI QIDQ3618901

Nicolas Quérou

Publication date: 3 April 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

iterative procedureregulationasymmetric informationoligopolyconjectures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

Cites Work

• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities.
• Using automatic tax changes to control pollution emissions
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

This page was built for publication: AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION