FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAMES: HOW TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS AND REDUCE HARVESTING LEVELS

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001960zbMath1157.91321MaRDI QIDQ3618904

Henk Folmer, Henk Norde, Kim Hang Pham Do

Publication date: 3 April 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueproportional rulepopulation monotonic allocation schemetransboundary fishery management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (1)

DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

Cites Work

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• Cores of convex games
• FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL
• GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING

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