Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information

DOI10.3982/ECTA7134zbMath1158.91319OpenAlexW1850144107MaRDI QIDQ3623078

Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner

Publication date: 16 April 2009

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7134

zbMATH Keywords

Harsanyi doctrinebelief-free equilibriarepeated game with incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (13)

A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games ⋮ On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria ⋮ The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting ⋮ Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Bad apples in symmetric repeated games ⋮ Strategic information exchange ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Recent advances in robust optimization: an overview ⋮ Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring

This page was built for publication: Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information