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Publication:3626678
zbMath1173.91349MaRDI QIDQ3626678
Steven J. Brams, M. Remzi Sanver
Publication date: 22 May 2009
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
votingCondorcet winnerfallback votingcoherence-inducing for candidatespreference approvalpreference approval votingstrongest-majority principle for votersstrongest-majority principle for votes
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