On Forward Induction

DOI10.3982/ECTA6956zbMath1160.91310OpenAlexW3122577109MaRDI QIDQ3627274

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date: 18 May 2009

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6956

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryequilibrium refinementbackward inductionforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (18)

Delegation Using Forward Induction ⋮ Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Entrepreneurial incentives and the role of initial coin offerings ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Invariance to representation of information ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ RULE RATIONALITY ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm

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