Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
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Publication:3627275
DOI10.3982/ECTA6917zbMath1160.91344OpenAlexW2104009091MaRDI QIDQ3627275
Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Vieille
Publication date: 18 May 2009
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6917
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (21)
ADVERSE SELECTION IN DYNAMIC MATCHING MARKETS ⋮ Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons ⋮ Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection ⋮ Dynamic price discovery: transparency vs. information design ⋮ Seller experimentation and trade ⋮ Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market ⋮ Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller ⋮ Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions ⋮ Public offers in the market for lemons with large discounting ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ Transparency of outside options in bargaining ⋮ A theory of bargaining deadlock ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection ⋮ SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection ⋮ Market screening with limited records
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