Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
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Publication:3638041
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_24zbMath1248.91009OpenAlexW2146457340MaRDI QIDQ3638041
Steve Chien, Alistair Sinclair
Publication date: 14 July 2009
Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_24
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