Learning by Questions and Answers: From Belief-Revision Cycles to Doxastic Fixed Points

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02261-6_11zbMath1246.03035OpenAlexW1496595205MaRDI QIDQ3638279

Sonja Smets, Alexandru Baltag

Publication date: 2 July 2009

Published in: Logic, Language, Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02261-6_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (10)

Deceit and indefeasible knowledge: the case of dubitatio ⋮ An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: abductive problem and abductive solution ⋮ Group Knowledge in Interrogative Epistemology ⋮ Agreement theorems in dynamic-epistemic logic ⋮ Keep changing your beliefs, aiming for the truth ⋮ The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents ⋮ Truth-tracking by belief revision ⋮ A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality ⋮ Logic and Learning ⋮ A Panorama of Iterated Revision

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• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• Conditional Doxastic Models: A Qualitative Approach to Dynamic Belief Revision
• Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

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