Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_14zbMath1179.91040OpenAlexW118193891MaRDI QIDQ3646715

Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 27 November 2009

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_14

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitycooperationenvironmental economicsincentive equilibrialinear-quadratic differential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Linear-quadratic optimal control problems (49N10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (6)

Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees ⋮ Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees ⋮ Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game ⋮ Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games ⋮ Does flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economics ⋮ Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization

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