Evolutionarily Robust Strategies: Two Nontrivial Examples and a Theorem

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_19zbMath1179.91035OpenAlexW28563151MaRDI QIDQ3646720

A. J. Shaiju, Pierre Bernhard

Publication date: 27 November 2009

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_19

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityreplicator dynamicsESSevolutionary gamesDarwinian dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ A dynamic game approach to uninvadable strategies for biotrophic pathogens ⋮ On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games

Cites Work

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• Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
• Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations
• Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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