Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_4zbMath1262.91057OpenAlexW199150203MaRDI QIDQ3648840

Seyed Hossein Naeemi, Rudolf Müller, André Berger

Publication date: 1 December 2009

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_4

zbMATH Keywords

convexitysocial choice theorymechanism designincentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations ⋮ TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

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