Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23zbMath1262.91006OpenAlexW1492050885MaRDI QIDQ3648861

Kamesh Munagala, Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 1 December 2009

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study ⋮ Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models ⋮ Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

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