Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9330-7zbMath1273.91204OpenAlexW2034293332MaRDI QIDQ365793

Omer Biran

Publication date: 9 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9330-7

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbargainingcollusionexternalitiessub-game perfect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Cites Work

• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment
• Bidder collusion
• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights

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