Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand

DOI10.2307/1912047zbMath0515.90010OpenAlexW2066981120MaRDI QIDQ3662939

Leonard J. Mirman, Steven A. Matthews

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/494.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic demandprivate informationmonopolistic competitionpricing decisionsentry decisionssignalling equilibrialimit pricing equilibriumone- industry two-firm two-period model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (16)

Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance ⋮ Duopoly signal jamming ⋮ Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information ⋮ Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games ⋮ Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels ⋮ Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts ⋮ Market signaling with grades ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Noisy signaling: theory and experiment ⋮ Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects ⋮ Commitment and observability in games ⋮ Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

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