Optimal strategies for dynamic games and the incentive to cooperate

DOI10.1080/00207728308926450zbMath0516.90091OpenAlexW2171355421MaRDI QIDQ3664863

Andrew J. Hughes Hallett

Publication date: 1983

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207728308926450

zbMATH Keywords

suboptimalitynon-causalitydynamic Stackelberg and Cournot strategiesoptimal equilibrium strategiesunrestrictedly competitive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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• Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Incentives to cooperate in linear quadratic difference games
• Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
• Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games