Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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Publication:3671785
DOI10.2307/1912116zbMath0521.90104OpenAlexW2002849158WikidataQ56701510 ScholiaQ56701510MaRDI QIDQ3671785
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/481.pdf
bargainingmechanism designparametric linear programsneutral optimumcore mechanismexpectational equilibriuminscrutable mechanism selectionprincipal with private informationsubordinates coordination
Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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