Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction

DOI10.2307/2296952zbMath0523.90023OpenAlexW2052256862MaRDI QIDQ3674369

Oliver D. Hart

Publication date: 1983

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296952

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationrisk aversionlabour marketimplicit contract theorynon-Walrasian unemployment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments ⋮ A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Insiders and outsiders and efficient asymmetric information contracts ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information ⋮ Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information ⋮ Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? ⋮ Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem ⋮ Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection ⋮ Principal-agent maintenance problem ⋮ Under- and overemployment in optimal layoff contracts

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