Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
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Publication:367464
DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0044-9zbMath1273.91058OpenAlexW2064233955MaRDI QIDQ367464
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0044-9
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Cites Work
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