A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0026-3zbMath1307.91134OpenAlexW2041131056WikidataQ125886447 ScholiaQ125886447MaRDI QIDQ367470

In-Koo Cho, Akihiko Matsui

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0026-3

zbMATH Keywords

matchinglong-term relationshipprocedural rationalityRawlsian maxmin criterionsympathy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Discrete-time games (91A50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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