The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
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Publication:367475
DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9zbMath1273.91057OpenAlexW3123110199MaRDI QIDQ367475
Alexander Isakov, David G. Rand
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9
Related Items (7)
Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Conditions for Cooperation and Trading in Value-Cost Dynamic Games ⋮ Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
Cites Work
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
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