Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
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Publication:367477
DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0034-3zbMath1277.91031OpenAlexW2041926109MaRDI QIDQ367477
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2316471
simulationsevolutionary dynamicsreplicator dynamicBrown-von Neumann-Nash dynamiccontinuous strategiesfirst price auction
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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