Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0037-0zbMath1273.91059OpenAlexW2058617427MaRDI QIDQ367482

Robert E. Molzon

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0037-0

zbMATH Keywords

learningevolutionary game theoryPareto efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• On the observational equivalence of random matching
• Random matching in adaptive dynamics
• Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• A Measure of Asymptotic Efficiency for Tests of a Hypothesis Based on the sum of Observations

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