Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations

DOI10.2307/1910993zbMath0562.90007OpenAlexW2013236384MaRDI QIDQ3675838

Gabrielle Demange

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910993

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economyperfect equilibriumdivide and choose methodefficiency-justice dilemmaefficient egalitarian equivalent allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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