Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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Publication:3677455
DOI10.2307/2526532zbMath0563.90024OpenAlexW2045004028MaRDI QIDQ3677455
Nancy L. Stokey, Jennifer F. Reinganum
Publication date: 1985
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526532
Nash equilibrianoncooperative dynamic gamesclosed loop) strategieseconomic competitionextraction of a nonrenewable common property resourceopenloop) strategies
Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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