A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1985.9989982zbMath0564.90095MaRDI QIDQ3679002

Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

closed form solutionalpha-power modelequal division kernelpay-off disbursement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• n-Person games with only 1, n? 1, and n-person coalitions
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game