Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9378-zzbMath1273.91215OpenAlexW2158010925MaRDI QIDQ368056

Tibor Neugebauer, Sascha C. Füllbrunn

Publication date: 18 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2066/112206

zbMATH Keywords

experimentfeedbackbetween-subject variationfirst-price sealed-bid auctionwithin-subject variation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

The effect of competition on risk taking in contests ⋮ The value of a fallback option ⋮ Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
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• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom: A graphical analysis

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