Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9347-yzbMath1273.91151OpenAlexW2128588867MaRDI QIDQ368059

Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date: 18 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationcoalition-free inducement relationsCSSBinvertible inducement relationsOSSBperfect foresight

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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