Who gains from information asymmetry?

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9351-XzbMath1293.91111OpenAlexW2071630435MaRDI QIDQ368065

Yosef Mealem, Gil S. Epstein

Publication date: 18 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96072

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationasymmetric contestsrent-seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Partial information disclosure in a contest ⋮ Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

Cites Work

• The politics of randomness
• Information in conflicts.
• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly

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