Under- and overemployment in optimal layoff contracts

DOI10.1007/BF01284384zbMath0566.90011OpenAlexW2077375957MaRDI QIDQ3682193

Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Murray Brown

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01284384

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketasymmetric informationinvoluntary underemploymentoptimal layoff contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Implicit contracts with effort incentives

Cites Work

• A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information
• Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
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