A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games1

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1985.9989996zbMath0567.90100OpenAlexW2095030264MaRDI QIDQ3683936

James M. Ekman, H. Andrew Michener, David C. Dettman, Young C. Choi

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1985.9989996

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoreexperimental studyimputation setrelative predictive accuracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Related Items (2)

Predictive superiority of the beta-characteristic function in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games ⋮ Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core

Cites Work

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• A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of an N Person Game

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