The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0045-8zbMath1272.91038OpenAlexW2095036704MaRDI QIDQ369471

Michael R. Caputo, Chen Ling

Publication date: 24 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.itweb.ucf.edu/workingpapers/2011-06.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesopen-loop Nash equilibriafeedback Nash equilibriaenvelope theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

Cites Work

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• Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis

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