An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
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Publication:3701223
DOI10.2307/2297591zbMath0578.90104OpenAlexW2129686327MaRDI QIDQ3701223
Roy Radner, Roger B. Myerson, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1986
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/77e82f9a5c3e4293e96229274f5c045113524229
discountingimperfect monitoringsupergame equilibriarepeated partnership gameuniformly inefficient equilibria
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