Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design

DOI10.2307/1914162zbMath0579.90109OpenAlexW1996561936MaRDI QIDQ3703689

Steven R. Williams

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/1408

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumefficiency in communicationmessage process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (14)

Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ A note on the `surjectivity property' ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production ⋮ Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

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