Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
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Publication:3707729
DOI10.2307/1911013zbMath0584.90013OpenAlexW2072960660MaRDI QIDQ3707729
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911013
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